The hard problem of consciousness is a distraction from the real one

11/18/2016

This essay challenges the notion of the 'hard problem' of consciousness and argues that it distracts from the real issues surrounding conscious experience. The author suggests that the hard problem, which focuses on explaining how and why subjective experience arises from physical processes, is a philosophical dead-end that perpetuates the mind-body dualism debate. Instead, the essay proposes shifting the focus towards the 'real problem' of consciousness, which involves understanding the mechanisms and functions of conscious experiences in relation to cognitive science and neuroscience. The author advocates for a more empirical and interdisciplinary approach to studying consciousness, rather than getting caught up in philosophical debates.

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